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Elaine Craig*

'I Do' Kiss and Tell: The Subversive
Potential of Non-Normative Sexual
Expression from Within Cultural Paradigms

Using a comparative analysis of the equality movements of sexual minorities in
Canada and India the author identifies a symbiosis between the subversive
benefits of a deconstructionist approach to equality and the practical
achievements to be gained by a rights-based model of social justice. The analysis
is conducted through an examination of the role that the expression of same-sex
desire plays in the legal and social positions of sexual minorities in Canada and
India The author argues that the acquisition of rights can provide sexual minorities
with greater access to dominant cultural rituals and that such access provides
opportunities to directly engage and challenge those dominant norms underlying
sexual minority oppression.

A I'aided'une analyse comparative des mouvements de revendication de I'egalite
des minorites sexuelles au Canada et en Inde. I'auteure releve une symbiose
entre les avantages subversifs d'une approche deconstructionniste de I'lgalte
et les gains pratiques qui peuvent 6tre obtenus grace 1 un modele de justice
sociale fond sur les droits Lanalyse est r6alis~e en procedant J un examen du
r6le que joue Iexpression du desir pour un individu du m6me sexe dans les
positions I6gale et sociale des minorites sexuelles au Canada et en Inde Lauteure
affirme que I'acquisition de droits peut accroitre l'acces des minorites sexuelles
aux rituels culturels dominants, et que cet accus accru offre les possibilit6s de
prendre J partie et de contester directement les normes dominantes qui soustendent loppression des minorites sexuelles.
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Foreword
I recently attended my first lesbian wedding. The wedding was in every
respect except one an exceptionally traditional event. In the days following this wedding I spoke with several other attendees. Some had attended
many other lesbian weddings and commitment ceremonies. For others,
this was, like mine, their first experience with same-sex nuptials. Everyone I spoke with however, articulated a similar sentiment about this
particular celebration. Whether it was the white dress or the toasts to the
brides or the tossing of the bouquets, each guest I spoke with identified
several aspects of this very traditional wedding that made them feel
disrupted in some manner. Each of the aspects identified pertained to one
or another of the traditional rituals performed by the couple. Why did this
wedding, filled \\ ith traditional rituals familiar to everyone, seem to create
feelings of disruption in a way that the individualized commitment
ceremonies commonly attended by the lesbian community do not? I
believe that the discomfort arose because of the subversive impact created
when \Nel known cultural rituals are employed to express or depict something other than their commonly understood meaning.
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Introducic in

The purpose of this paper is to reconcile what I suggest is a false dichotomy
in contemporary equality discourse. It seems that much energy and intellect is N\asted pitting the subversixe benefits of a queer theory/
deconstructionist approach to equality against the achievements reached
thus far by the -ay and lesbian rights mox ement. It is important to recognize that access to a rights regime such as that developed in Canada
requires an identity-based approach to equallit that inevitably leads to the
exclusion of some. and the homogenization of others. However, so too is it
important to recognize that rights create poxxer and that some manifestation of power may be necessary to facilitate the subversion of those
normative standards that contribute to heterosexual hegemony. I \\ill
argue that the subversive effect of minority sexual expression can be
employ ed to counter or temper the homogenization and essentialism which
appears to be the unavoidable by-product of a sexual minority rights movement. I x1 ill further suggest that the subversive potential of sexual minority expression is facilitated by rights discourse and the gay and lesbian
rights movement.'
An examination of the role that the expression of same-sex desire plays
in the legal, and social position of sexual minorities in both Canada and
India rex eals the subversive po\\ er of cultural appropriation and adaptation. An inter-play betx\een rights discourse and the de-stabilization of
normati\ e standards exists and the successful pursuit of equality requires
both. I xxill assert that the acquisition of rights by minorities promotes
acceptance of these minorities among dominant populations. Acceptance
broadens the conduct deemed permissible by dominant norms. This is a
positixe step towards sexual equality; howexer, it alone may not have a
subversive effect. The process of broadening a norm still allows for a model
of entitlement and equality based on exclusi\ ity. Equality also requires
tolerance of conduct which does not conform to normative standards.
Tolerance is 'acceptance" of conduct outside of the norm and as such it is
not based on a model of exclusivity.' I will suggest that tolerance can be
achieved through some degree of normative deconstruction. Without some

I. I use the term sexual minority in an attempt to be inclusis c ofa diNerse range of indisiduals and
groups whose sexuality and gender identit. do not conform %kithnormative se\Li, ideoIog .This is
neither a static, nor singular identity.
2.
1 note it could be argued that the term 'tolerance' acknowledges a power differential in which
the dominant, power holders, 'grant' tolerance to a minority. Howeser, I ssould suggest that the term
tolerance leaves intact the notion of'deviant from'; it implies a tolerance of the deviation rather than
an acceptance of the deviant into the norm.

406

The Dalhousie Law Journal

deconstruction, acceptance into these dominant norms will be possible for
some sexual minorities through the acquisition o,power but tolerance for
those \\ho continue to exist outside the dominant norms will not develop.
The pursuit of equality for sCLIal minorities in Canada and India has
taken different paths. In Canada the focus has very much been on the
acquisition of rights. In India, the lack of a legal mechanism to pursue
justice through the law has dictated an approach which may be more
focused on the promotion of tolerance. A comparison betxeen the legal
and social position of sexual minorities in India and Canada, made through
the lens of sexual minority expression, rex eals that the disruption of a sexual
hegemoui requires both tolerance and po\cr. The appropriation and adaptation of'cultural rituals serx es as an effectix e tool for de-stabilizing heteronormatixe standards. I \\ ill argue that the acquisition of rights can provide
,cxual minorities xxith greater access to dominant cultural rituals which,
through the social expression of non-normatixe sexual desire directly
engages those dominant norms underl\ ing sexual minorit\ oppression.

I. WhY ('ompare Canada and Inlia?
Contrasting the historical similarities and substantixe constitutional
similarities inIndia and Canada with the distinctions found inthe contemporar\ rights regimes for sexual minorities in these countries permits an
analxsis focused on the role of sexual expression inthese two culturally
distinct societies. Constitutional law in India and Canada share in
common a history of British colonialism. While the manner and duration
of colonialism in the txxo countries is distinct," there are similarities with
respect to the historical treatment of sexual minorities in India and Canada.
Both countries inherited lax\ s from Britain which, by prohibiting acts such
as sodomy, indirectly criminalized sexual relations between individuals of
the same gender.4 Ga\ men x\ere prosecuted under these anti-sodomy laws

3.
India did not adopt a constitution inaugurating a democratic republic until 20 January 1950.
D I BalIey. "Intrduction to the (onstitution of India'" (1961 i 11) U. Pa. L. Re\ Q13.
4
Indian I'cial
Cdc. Act 4S, I S,)),
online: India -a\\Info -http:/ wA,,a indialawinfo. con
bareact, ipchtinl %see generally Shcrr Joseph. "The Lao\and Homosexuality in India" (1998),
online: (,hbal Reproductive Health Forum <http:www hsph.harvard eduOrganizations healthnet'
SAia/suchana 0909/rh374 html-.' ee also Terry Goldic. "Qucer Nation?" in Terry Goldie. ed., In a
(h)'er C(tnitr Gat and L, hian .Sttlic,'
in th'Canadian Context (Vancouver: Arsenal Pulp Press,
201)1) 7 at 10.
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more frequently than any other demographic by the post-colonial justice
systems in both India and Canada.'
The Constitutions of both India and Canada guarantee fundamental
rights to equality. which to varying degrees promise protection against
discrimination for sexual minorities. In Canada, section 15 of the Charier
of Rights and Freedomns" guarantees both equality before and under the
1aNN and the equal protection and benefit of the laxx, by prohibiting
discrimination. Section 15 has been interpreted to include freedom from
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.' In India, Article 14 of
the Constitution ofIndia guarantees equality before the law and the equal
protection of the law. ' Article 15 prohibits discrimination on the grounds
of sex.' In Canada freedom of expression, including sexual expression, is
guaranteed under section 2(b) of the Charter.10 Article 19 of the Constitution olIndia states that all citizens have the right to freedom of speech and
expression."'
Despite these historical and constitutional similarities, the post-colonial treatment, social and legal position, and perception and tolerance of
sexual minorities in India and Canada have followed different paths. In
Canada, Pierre Trudeau ostensibly pulled the government out of the bedrooms of Canadian sexual minorities by decriminalizing buggery and
certain 'acts of gross indecency" in 19 6 9 .i2 With the 1995 determination
by the Supreme Court of Canada that sexual orientation is a prohibited
ground of discrimination under s. 15 of the ('harter" has come ten years
of arguably successful gay and lesbian rights litigation in Canada."4 Today
same-sex couples in Ontario, British Columbia, Quebec, Nova Scotia,

5
Joseph, ibid., ,ee also Kell'. Cogwel. "India: Kiss the Dinosaur (6oodbc", online: The Gully
<http: VvA'w.thegul Iycom essaysga. mundo o21122 -sec 377_antiLa. inhtml>; F. Byrne, Homophobia: a histor (.Nes York- Metropolitan Books, 2000.
6.
Canadian Charter ,tRights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution I ct, 19N2, being Schedule B to Canada .tt 1982 (U K.), l9s2, c. 11. .15 [Charter].
7.
Egan v Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, 124 D L.R. 4th) 609.
Constitution Act. /950 (India), as am. to Constitution (Eighty.-sixth Amendment) Act, 2002,
8.

Article 14.
9.
Ibid., Article I S.
10. Supra note 6, s 2(b).
II. Supra note 8, Article 19.
12. Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1968-1969, S.C. 1968-1969, c. 38, s. 7; see also Gary Kinsman,
The regulation ol desire. sexualii, in Canada, i \lontr~al: Black Rose Books, 1987).
13.

Supra note 7.

14.

See AI v H., [199912 S.C.R. 3, 171 D.L.R. 4th) 577; Vriend v Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493,

67 Alta. L.R. (3d) 1; Halpern v. Canada (A.G.) (2003) 65 O.R. (3d) 161 (C.A.) [Halpern].
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NLanitoba, the Yukon, and Ne\ foundland haxe the legal right to marry. 5
( on\ ersely, legal circumstances for se\Lal minorities in India have not
changed significantly since adoption of the British anti-sodomy law that
no\w constitutes the substance of s. 377 of the Indian Penal Code." This
provision subjects those members of Indian society who "voluntarily have
carnal intercourse against the order of nature w%ith any man, woman or
animal." to the possibility of life imprisonment. While the section has not
frequentl\ been iMoked in India. in those cases in which it has been
applied, the accused has disproportionately been a member of a sexual
minority group. L
\ petition by the New Delhi based AIDS activist organization the Naz
Foundation, challenging the constitutionality ots. 377 of the Indian Penal
Code under the equality pro\ isions enshrined in the Constitution o/India,
\\as filed with the Delhi High Court in 2002. While it has not yet been
heard, the Court did note, in a preliminary heaing, that the government
\ill ha~e to present a strong case if it hopes to preserxe the law." The
oo, ernment's response to the petition, filed on September 20, 2003 claims
that not ony is the provision constitutional but it should be expanded in
order to encompass more lesbian acti\ ty; the government asserts that
"'Indian society is intolerant to the practices of homosexuals/lesbianism.""
Despite the Delhi High Court's comment in the Naz Foundation
petition, the sentiment of India's Judiciar, towards sexual minorities
appears to reflect the lack of acceptance articulated by government
officials in response to the petition. In Gopi v State of Karnataka, the
Supreme Court of India, in likening an appellant con\ icted of raping a one
and half\car old girl to gays and lesbians, stated that "[s]exual offences ...
constitute an altogether different kind of crime which is the result of a
per\erse mind. The perversity may result in homosexuality or in the
commission of rape.""'

I

Halpern. ibid Egale Canada Inc. v Canada (A G). [2003] 7 \k \\ R 22. B.C.J. No 9)4
A()(QL) [I gale Canal], Liguec Catholique pour I'' dirit,
de I "ommne c Hendricks. [2004] J.Q.
No 253. RJQ 85 1 (C \
i.)L). Boutilier t \,,ia5otia t (;.),
[20041 's S.J.No. 357 (C.A.)
(Q I;
/ v Canada (A G , [2111141
\i.JNo 4N (Q B.) Fam. Di.) (QL,Diunhar v Yukon,
[2004] YKS( 54. YJ. so (,I(S.C.), The Neifoundland ca,c \.,suncontested bN the Go\ernment
and unreporicd
I (, ,'it a note 4
17
Joseph, xupra note 4.
18. 1 og xell, squra note 5.
l
Siddharth Srj\a,,a\tia. "Demonising Homosexuals In India" International Herald Tribune (20
September 2)13), online: Counter Currents <http:, \\'\.countercurrents.org gen-sri\astava
2001(10htm,
-10 [2110ili14 L.R. I 1045 at para. 16.
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A substantive comparison between the text of the Canadian and Indian
constitutions could potentially explain the seemingly radical difference in
the treatment of sexual minorities in two countries which started with such
similar legal approaches towards sexual minorities, and which now
guarantec somewhat similar fundamental rights. One could point to the
amending formula in the Constitution o/ India and argue that its
undemanding procedure creates a deliacto parliamentary supremacy that
subjects Indian minorities to the t\ rannv of the majority. Perhaps distinctions in the wording of each constitution's limiting proxisions on fundamental rights, or distinctions in the declaration of emergency powers
between the t\\ o constitutions could ser e as explanations for the discrepanc\. Htowever, I would argue that distinctions in the wording of constitutions. or excn distinctions between the political structures they establish
are not alone determinative of whether or not constitutional guarantees
\vill affect social change. The constitutional guarantees of equality and
freedom from discrimination may be a necessary precursor for social change
in a societ\. but whether such guarantees actually can or do create social
change depends on the historical and cultural context in which they are
situated.
I would suggest that constitutional law provides a mechanism through
which to examine the necessar\ ingredients for social change- a society's
application and interpretation of its constitution is, in part, a reflection of
its culture and culture is a determinatix e factor in the process of social
change. I am not asserting that difference is only related to culture or that
recognition of cultural difference is all that is necessary to effect social
change.' I am suggesting. hoN\e\er. that the cooption of cultural rituals
can be emplo\ed to promote the tolerance of difference necessary to
create social change. Indian theorist Ratna Kapur argues that tremendous
potential for social change exists when -[c]ulture is invoked to counter
culture."" A variation of this reasoning may be demonstrated by the
manner in which the Metropolitan Community Church of Toronto used
the ancient Christian tradition of publishing the banns of marriage as an

21. Himani Banerjii arguc, that in order to addre.. the underlying social and economic infrastructure that perpetuate, oppression, difference must be conceptualized as something more than merely
cultural. I do not dispute her a,,,crtion. I ',uuvct only that the adaptation of mainstream cultural
rituals by subcultures is one method of de'tabilizing the ,,uocicial infrastructure which supports oppressive hegemonies. H. Bannerjii, "Charles Taylor'" Politics of Recognition: A Critique" in Himani
Banneiri, ed., The Dark Side ofthe Naton (Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Prc',,. 2i0 125 at 142
22. Ratna Kapur, "Postcolonial Erotic Disruptions: Legal Narratives of Culture, Sex. and Nation in
India" (2001) 10 Colum. J. Gender & L. 333 at 314
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alternati\c to a municipally issued marriage license when the city refused
to grant licenses to same-sex couples.2 1
Comparing the pursuit of equality for sexual minorities in India and
Canada and the current social and legal status of sexual minorities in these
countries offers a unique framework through wxhich to demonstrate that a
comprehensive theory of justice requires the acquisition of rights and the
subversion of norms. In Canada, as discussed above, the gay and lesbian
rights movement has established legal protection and equality for gays
and lesbians through the acquisition of rights. However, I would suggest
that these successes have done little to subvert normative understandings
of sexuality, as a result, these legal \ictories have not significantly
ad\ anced the level of actual tolerance for sexual diversity in Canada. "On
the one hand wve have largely won our formal human rights but on the
other hand our sexualities are often still criminalized and our relationships
stigmatized." '4 Unlike in Canada, as a result of the lack of legal rights for
sexual minorities in India, "a major focus of Indian and South Asian
Diaspora gay rights campaigns has been to challenge 'exclusionary narrati\es about culture."' - As a result, any examination of equality for sexual
minorities in India requires an analysis informed by culture and counterculture. The purpose of comparing India and Canada is to examine the
process of pursuing access to democracy and equality for sexual minorities in both countries. That these countries may be at different stages in
this pursuit, or on different paths towards this goal is relevant only insofar
as it offers insight into each country's own processes and circumstances.

1I. Normalizing and Queering
In Canada, as noted, the gay and lesbian rights movement has achieved
more individual rights for some sexual minorities than almost anywhere
else in the xxorld.2b Yet, there exists an argument that what has actually
been achieved is limited access to a rights regime for a homogenized,
essentialized segment of sexual minorities without any significant disruption of the heterosexual hegemony responsible for their oppression.

23, Halpern. supra note 14 at para. 11.
24
Gary Kinsman, "Challenging Canadian and Queer Nationalisms" in Terry Goldie, ed., In a
Queer C(,untrv Gay and Lesian Studies in the Canadian Context (Vancouver: Arsenal Pulp Press,
2001 ) 209 at 22)
2S.
ladhavi Sunder, "Intellectual Property and Identity Politics: Playing with Fire" (2000) 4 J.
(lender, Race, & Just. 69 at 93.
26
A, noted, ,ame-sex marriage has already been granted in a number of Canadian provinces.
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The purpose of my discussion is to assert that the relationship betwccn
rights discourse/identit\ politics and deconstructionist theories is not
irreconcilable and that the two approaches are actually symbiotic.
To suggest such a symbiosis is to acknowledge some utility of both
approaches. Since one underpinning of a deconstructionist approach to
equality is a critique of the group identity based politics associated with
rights based movements, making such an argument theoretically implies
some affirmation of the value of these critiques to rights-based models of
equality. It is necessary then, to identify these critiques. In identifying these
critiques my focus will be on the Canadian gay and lesbian rights movement where the rights regime for sexual minorities is more developed than
that in India.
The acquisition of rights for gays and lesbians has created a great deal
of legal acceptance for same-sex couples in Canada. As noted in my introduction. hoxxexer, it is my position that the notion of acceptance is based
on a model of exciusiVity in x\hich the scope of the normatix e behax ior is
broadened to some degree. but the belief that behavior outside of the dominant norm is negative remains intact.
It appears as though the benefits gained by the legal victories of the
gay and lesbian rights movement in Canada are axailable only to that
segment of sexual minorities that most resembles heterosexual norms and
ideals. "Some critical legal scholars have argued that rights are individualistic and formalistic and thus unable to address the systemic and structural
w\ays in which disadxantaged groups arc oppressed."'- They argue that
rights discourse in Canada obscures pox\ er dynamics and de-contextualizes
and de-radicalizes the political aspect of rights claims.> Certainly rights
ha\ e been achie\ ed for monogamous gays and lesbians whose couplings
and choice of family structure loosely conform w\ith the normative
standards in place for heterosexual relationships and families in Canada.
Hoxwexer. those members of sexual minorities who are not monogamous,
or \ hose gender or sexual orientation or financial situation do not fit
easily into the categories developed by normative standards and sexual
practices, or whose family structures do not resemble the traditional
family model are often excluded from the benefits of these rights. If the
model upon which the granting of recognition or status or equality

27.

Ratna Kapur and Brenda Cossman. Subverive mt

'Ne Delhi: Sage Publications, 1996i at 286.
28 Ibid. at 287.

feminist engagenent% with law in India,
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remains one based on practices of exclusion or assimilation it is likely that
the heterosexual hegemony that currently suppresses sexual minorities in
Canada x\ ill remain intact. An equality movement that fails to disrupt these
hetero-normative standards perpetuates a model of justice that remains
exclusionary for many sexual minorities. In addition, the pursuit of equality through the acquisition of rights is limited to the acquisition of those
'rights' available under any particular regime. A rights regime that
provides rights such as same-sex pension benefits, tax benefits, spousal
support, child support, and employment benefits only assists those sexual
minorities that can structure their families, relationships, gender and sexualit\ in a manner which conforms to the infrastructure underlying such
right,. \n infrastructure built to support the majoritarian models of family,
sex and lifestyle. Highlighting the difficulty v\ ith perpetuating rather than
troubling normatixe standards, Brenda Cossman states, in the context of
examining the deconstruction of gender norms, that
[a] fixed and rigid deploxment tit' gender ma\ allow some subjects to
come on stage But, the multiple other subjecti\ ties constructed in and
through gender remain beyond the margins, abject beings who are not yet
the subjects of this discourse. who remain relegated to the zone of
"uninhabitabilit\'.-"
The decision in A i-i.) v B.(B.)." in which a lesbian couple in Ontario
made an application to the Superior Court of Ontario requesting that the
non-biological mother's name be added to their son's birth certificate
supports this position. The birth certificate stated only the names of the
child's biological mother and biological father. The biological mother, the
biological father and the non-biological mother had co-parented the child
since birth. The Court refused the application, stating that neither the legislation nor the Court's paric'n patriajurisdiction provided them with the
authority to provide legal recognition of all three of the child's parents.3
The suggestion that the pursuit of access to a rights regime such as that
found in Canada promotes conformity and assimilation32 is advanced by
Andrea Frolica in her analysis of Toronto Pride Festival themes over the

21)
Can.
30,
31.

Brenda (.' lnan, "Gender Performance, SC\ual Subjects and International Lass
J.L & Jur 281 at 28( , .
[2003] 0 J. No. 1215, 225 DLR. (4th) 371 (Sup. 0
Ihid.

32.

See e.g Kinsman, uqlwa note 12.

(2002) 15
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course of the past two decades." She suggests that the choice of themes
for Toronto's annual Pride Festival ha\ e been distinctly more conformist
during those years in which significant legal \ ictories were achieved in the
gay and lesbian rights movement. For example, in 1986 the theme of the
Pride Festi\al \\as the confrontational "Vc are Everywhere: 150 Years of
Faggots and Dy kes." Howe\er. in 1987. the year that sexual orientation
was identified as a prohibited ground of discrimination under the Ontario
Human Rights Code, the theme was the more conformist "Rightfully
Proud." ' In the early 199 0 's she argues, the themes were overtly confrontational: "By All Means Necessary. ... Breaking the Silence," "Come Out"
Ho\\wever in 1005, the year that the Supreme Court read sexual orientation
into section 15 of the Charter." the more docile theme "Remember,
Celebrate, Make A Difference" was adopted."
The gay and lesbian rights movement in Canada has also been
criticized for essentializing sexual minority identity. The manner in which
the rights regime in Canada is structured has forced the gay and lesbian
rights movement to essentialize sexual minorities in their efforts to pursue
equality: this prioritizes one concept of sexuality over others. "It is not that
citizenship and equality rights legitimize pre-existing identities, but rather,
the contours of identity are shaped b\ the demands for citizenship and
rights models themselves."- The manner in which the jurisprudence
interpreting and applying section 15 has developed has also contributed to
this effect."' To access equality rights in Canada, the test for a violation of
section 15 of the Charter requires either that a claimant belong to an identifiable minority with a history of oppression or that the legal distinction
challenged be based on an immutable personal characteristic of the claim-

33. Andrea Frolic. -\ear it with Pride the Fashions ofToronto's Pnde Parade and ( anadian Queer
Identities" in TerrN Goldie, ed., In a Queer Cmintri Gay and Le~han Studies in the Canadian

Context (Vancouver: Arsenal Pulp Press, 2001) 257 at 259
34
35.

Ibid.
Fgan, supra note 7.

36.
37.

Frolic, supra note 33.
BJ \\ ra,, "The Elephant, The louse, and The Lesbian \ational Park" in Terry Goldie, ed., In
a Queer Countrs: Gay and Lesbian Studies in the Canadian Context (Vancouver: Arsenal Pulp Press,
2001) 160 at 166

38. The adverse impact of the manner in which section 15 has been applied may be unavoidable
and is in all likelihood inadvertent. Nonetheless, its effects, if they are to be counteracted, must be
identified.
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ant."' As noted by Justice lacobucci in Law, section 15 of the Charter has
dc\ eloped as a comparative concept; as a result it is necessary to identify a
comparator group \\ hen making a claim under section 15." To establish
sexual orientation as an analogous ground of discrimination under section
15 required the creation of a singular group identity. The group identity
created in turn impacted the course of the ga. and lesbian rights movenent. "The development of lesbian and gay movements ...followed from
both the production of this distinctixe identity and its perceixed exclusion
(or inclusion as criminality) \\ithin dominant discourse.'"
In the case of sexual minorities, the notion of a singular, discrete sexual
minority identity was artificially constructed. This is problematic for two
reasons. As Nancy Fraser would likely aruee. the creation of an externally
identifiable minority, cx n if done in the pursuit of positive recognition,
might serxe only to develop a more discernible target for further oppression.4
In addition, the requirement that a singular 'gay identity' be
created may lead to intolerance of se\ual and gender diversity within sexual
minority communities. This 'gay identit\.' strategically developed to
produce the least threatening subject to heterosexual sensibilities, is not
representative or tolerant of a great number of sexual lifestyles and gender
ariations that cannot or xx ill not conform to the fable identity. Those sexual
minorities \xho can or do conform to the more palatable notion of the
'homosexual' and xxho as a result enjoy nexx found rights and power, have
a vested interest in silencing those sexual minorities whose lifestyles, and
gender identities do not support the gay identity developed and marketed
to heterosexual society.
As noted, the jurisprudence has also established that section 15 prohib-

34
For the c\ olution of the tcst for dicrimination under section I, of the Chartcr see Lau Soc iti
c/ Brctli (,,thimI)w
4ndrew', II),X)
II
'.R. 143, 56 D.L.R. (4thj I here the Supreme Court of

Canada. in making one of their first attempts to define discrimination under section 15, stipulated
that the claimant be a member of a discrete, insular minoritN. Follo,. tog this decision \\as Eldridge
7
v British Columbia (.. G.), [ 199'] 3 S C.R 624, 15 D.L.R. (4th) j- in v hich the Court stated that
the discrimination must be based on a personal characteristic
Toda'. the test for discrimination
under section I of the ('hurter still requires that the discrimination be based on an immutable per,.nal trait or that the claimant be in a historically disad%antaged position in soeietN. see for example
Law v ( an/(,,h
tf iicr
of Eniplviment and Immirutto). [IN991 I S.C.R. 497, 170 D.L.R. (4th) 2
[Law]
40
IMid.
41
Didi Herman, Rights ,/txutage Stru.gle.ih/,
Leshian and Guy Legal Equaliti (Toronto:
University of I ronto Press. 1994) at I.
42
\an.'
Fraser, "From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a 'Postsocialist'
Age" in Nancv Fraser. ed.. hsn(c Interruptus Cr tical
Re/lc tum on the "Postsocialist" Condition(sew 'ork Routlcdgc. 1997) II.
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its discrimination based on immutable personal characteristics. The
Supreme Court of Cianada agreed that sexual orientation was an analgous
ground under section 15 by determining that sexual orientation "is a deeply
personal characteristic that is either unchangeable or changeable only at
unacceptable personal costs"." This particular prerequisite to protection

under section 15 has inadvertently contributed to a discourse that perpetuates a pathologization of gay identity purported to have been discarded in
the I-)T)'s when 'homosexualitN' was removed from the DSM-IV. 44
Requiring the identification of an immutable personal trait restricted the
wav sexual minorities could characterize their sexuality \vithin mainstream
culture. It encouraged an era of 'it is not a choice.' 'it is not my fault' and
"\\e were born that \\a\' defensive and apologetic declarations from the
gay and lesbian communitx. Such discourse implicitly attaches a negatixe
association to non-normative sexualities.
An infrastructure for attaining rights that requires the creation of a
singular sexual minority identit\ with shared traits very effectively
perpetuates the notion of sexuality as a static, immutable entity. In some
ways it creates a false binary La\ straight not dissimilar to the male female
dichotomy identified as a falke by gender theorists such as Judith Butler.
It inhibits acceptance of those more fluid and dix erse conceptions of sexuality that, I \ould argue, pose an even greater threat to normative understandings of sexuality. While certainly an acknowledgement of some sexual
diversity, the gay straight binary created by this system is not tolerant of
any conception of sexuality which does not fit into one of these two
categories; if nothing else. it allow\ s the cultural and legal infrastructure
developed by a heterosexual hegemony to continue to define sexuality.
The focus on the pursuit of gay and lesbian rights in Canada has, due to
the inherent limitations of the rights-based model of justice employed in
Canada, limited the ability to subx ert dominant sexual norms. I would
suggest further that the limiting provisions contained in section 1 of the
Chartea 5 and more specifically, the reasoning developed under the Oakes
framework for interpreting section 1.46 requires the Court to overtly refute
any subversive effect a successful equality based Charter challenge might

43 Egan. supra note 7 at para. 5.
44 Marc A. Fajer. "( an "ko Real \icn Eat Quiche Together" Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Le,bians and (,ay Men" ( 1-2) 46 U. Miami L. Rev. 511 at 537.
"Homosexuality is a pejorative descriptive term developed h a medical profession that basically
believed those it called homosexual to be phsiLcally or mentally ill".
45. Charter, supra note 6.
46. R v Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 26 D.L.R. (4th) 200.
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hold. This was demonstrated in Canada (.4ttornev General) v. Halpern,

the Ontario same-sex marriage decision." 7 Aspects of the second branch of
the Oakes test stipulate that to be proportional and therefore justified
under section 1 of the Charter, a rights violation must be rationally
connected to the objective of the law and the law must only minimally
impair the right. This analysis inadvertently requires the Court, should it
decide that the violation is not saved under section 1, to engage in an analysis
\\ hich minimi/cs, dismisses or refutes the subversive potential of a finding in fa\or of the claimant. For instance, in Halpern, much of the Attorney-General's argument focused on ajustification for the section 15 violation under section 1.This invol\ed argument that the institution of
marriace wkas sacred, and that it had static purposes which would be
disrupted by allowing same-sex couples access to the institution. As a
result, in determining that maintaining marriage as an exclusively heterosexual institution was not rationally connected to the purposes of
marriage, the Court \\
as careful to affirm that the traditional 'purposes' of
marriage, to encourage procreation, child rearing and companionship, would
not be disrupted by allowing access to gays and lesbians. The Court
cautiously a\oided any challenge to the normative understanding of
marriage. "It
isnot disputed that marriage has been a stabilizing and effective societal institution." '
The Attornc\ General argued that the violation was minimally impairing because "[c]hanging the definition of marriage to incorporate samesex couples would profoundly change the \ cry essence of a fundamental
societal institution."4 ' He argued that changing an essential feature of
marriage hb allowing same-sex couples to marry wNould result in a
destabilization of the institution and \\oUld have adverse effects on men,
women and children. In responding to the goxernment's argument under
section 1, the Court consistently articulated that allowing same-sex unions
\\ould not disrupt, destabilize or impact the institution of marriage in any
5
manner.
Similar rhetoric is evident in the choice of language employed by the
Supreme Court of Canada in the same-sex marriage reference."' While the

47. lalpern. ,hpru note 14.
48
Ihid. atpara. 129

49 Ibid. atpara. 133.
SO. Ibid. atpara. 121.
R .c/'rte rc Saine-Sci iMarriage. f20(41 3 S C.R 9'8.
24(, D.L.R. (4th) 193. The Federal Government referred to the Supreme Court of Canada four questions regarding the constitutionality of
their
proposed legislation Icgali/ig same-scx marriage.
51.
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Court did reject the argunent that the 'natural' growth of our living tree
constitution preclude,, same-sex marriage, they did so not in objection to
the notion that a 'natural' core meaning of marriage exists but because
they were, in this instance, faced x\ith competing views on what those
natural limits are. The notion that an objectixe 'natural' meaning of
marriage exists was not challenged.

111. Wf'hY isit \eccssar' to Subveirt \Ia/oritarianSexual Norms?
The tremendous progress towards legal equality achieved for sexual
minorities in Canada has not been paralleled by an increased degree of
tolerance for sexual diversity in Canadian society. The acquisition of rights
by Canada's ga\ and lesbian movement has broadened the sexual conduct
and relationships legall\ accepted in Canada. It has also, I will argue, placed
gays and lesbians in Canada in a position to facilitate the promotion of
tolerance through the subversion of dominant sexual norms. However, the
attainment of these rights alone has done little to subvert those sexual norms
that support the heterosexual hegemony. Subversion of these norms is
important to the pursuit of equality, while rights do the work necessary to
attain legal status and as a result power. subxersion is necessary to create
tolerance. Disrupting dominant sexual norms challenges mainstream understandings of the scope of human sexuality, this, I suggest, promotes
tolerance of sexual behaxiors. life,t\les and relationships which fall outside of dominant sexual norms.
The Ontario government's response to the landmark decision in A! v
H,52 in which the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the exclusively
heterosexual definition of spouse under Ontario's Family Law Act
violated the Charter, is indicative of the manner in which a legal victory
can provide rights, such as access to spousal support, but do little to
actually subvert the normative standards underlying the discrimination.53
The Ontario government's 1999, omnibus Bill 5, enacted in response to
the Supreme Court's directie in A1 v.H to provide same-sex partners with
the same rights as common-law heterosexual couples, amended the
language of sixty-seven provincial statutes in order to provide these rights,
but did so without re-defining 'spouse' or 'family' to include same-sex
relationships. The legislation granted the rights without challenging the

52.
53.

Supra note 14.
Kinsman, supra note 24.
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definitions of terms deemed discriminatory by the Supreme Court of
Canada. A similar move was made by the No%a Scotia government when it
rc\amped the Famil' Maintennce .-t '4 to include domestic rights for
same-sex couples without re-defining the meaning of spouse. One could

speculate cynically that, avoiding such inclusion is why the title of the act
\as changed to the ,laintenance and Custody ,4ct," and no longer
contains the word family.
Gary Kinsman's discussion of the Canadian government's exclusionary policies against sexual minorities, predominant in the 1950's and 1960's,
but which he asserts did not formally end until the early 1990's, is illustrative of this lack of tolerance tow ards sexual di\ersity despite the protection of' legal equality.'

Kinsman notes that as late as 1998, a Canadian

Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) spokesperson stated that "security
clearances can still be denied to closeted homosexuals because they have
something to hide."'_ This social intolerance of sexual diversity is further
evidenced by Canadian jurisprudence on the issue of obscenity. Obscenity
laws are meant to impugn particular types of sexual expression. However,
qualifying material as obscene implicit]\ impugns the morality of both the
sexual expression and the sexual conduct it represents." An examination
of obscenity la\ws then, may gauge the moral perspectives towards nonnormative sexual practices of those creating and enforcing such laws. I
would suggest that obscenity law s in Canada reflect the low degree of

tolerance towards non-normative sexual conduct in Canadian society.
Obscenity law s that disproportionately target or overtly impact materials
depicting sexual acts betm een individuals of the same gender reflect social
and legal communities intolerant of such sexual conduct.
In both Canada and India the legal approach to obscenity was inherited
from the British common law. R. v Hicklin, 5 which was the leading precedent in Canada \\ell into the twentieth century, and remains the authority
in India today."' The decision defines obscenity as any expression that

54
55
S,
57.

R.", N.S. 1989, c.
),renamed taitenance and Cust,..i1 4t.
R S NS 1989, c. 160, as am. b\ 2000, c.29, 2(2).

Kinsman. uipra note 24 at217.
Ihid.

58 Ratna Kapur, "'Law and the Scxual Subaltern: A Comparative Perspective- (Paper presented to
the Symposium: Re-Orienting I i\sand Sexuality, Cleveland State Unicrsit,, October 1999) (2000)
48 C'le.
Si. L Rev 15
59. 1968), L.R. 3 Q B 360 [icklin].
60. Scc RanJt v Statt of llauh/a/t1. I195 A.I.R. 81, \%here the Supreme Court of India, in
affirming ticklin as the authority, defined obscenits as,material which is"offensive to modesty or
dccency. lewd, filthy and repulsii "
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could corrupt morality. This is a broad and subjective definition with much
room for individual judicial discretion. In R v.But/cr. the leading case on
the definition of obscenity in Canada today, Justice Sopinka, in dismissing
the precedential value of Hicklin stated that "[t]he prevention of dirt for
dirt's sake is not a legitimate objcctl\e.i That said, the production of
obscenity is currentlN prohibited in Canada by section 163 of the Criminal
Code under a heading which harkens back to the language employed in
Hicklin: "Offences Tending to Corrupt Morals.""- An examination of the
application of obscenity la\' sin Canada regarding scxually explicit material invol\ ing sexual minorities, in cases such as Little Sisters Book and
,4rt Emporiun v Canada, reveals that despite the codification of obscenity laws and new case law on the issue, the approach in Canada today is
not significantly more tolerant of sexual diversity than it was under the
test set out in Hicklin 135 years ago."' In Little Sisters, the owners of a
Vancouver bookstore challenged the constitutionality of certain provisions
of the Custons.4ct. 4 Little Sistcr involved Customs Officials who were
targeting gay and lesbian materials imported to the bookstore. In upholding the legislation the Supreme Court of Canada determined that legislators were entitled to assume that their lawrs would be applied in a fashion
consistent with the Charter They held that it was not the responsibility of
legislators to enact regulations to ensure that their laws were applied
constitutionally; as a result, while the Court determined that the legislation violated freedom of expression under section 2 of the Charterthey
found that, with the exception of a re\ erse onus clause, it was saved under
section 1. The majority also ruled that the "community standards" test
applied to identify obscene material established in Butler, was constitutional. Taking a formal approach to the equality provisions under section
15 of the Charter they stated that the standard did not discriminate against
sexual minorities because 'the national community' w as made up of many
minorities.65
In June 2001, the police in Lucknow, India raided the offices of two
non-profit AIDS organizations whose objectives were to educate the gay
community in Lucknow about sexual health and harm reduction. The

61.
62.
63.
193
64.
65.

R. v Butler, [19921 I S.C.R. 452. X9 D.L.R. (4th) 449.
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c.C-46. s.745.
Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v Canada (Minister of Justice), [2001
D.L.R. (4th) 193 [Little Sisters].
Customs Act, R.S.C. 1985 (2nd Supp. c. 1,ss.58,71
Little Sisters, supra note 63 at para. 57.
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police arrested four workers, confiscated their AIDS education material
and charged them \xith possession of obscene materials and conspiracy to
commit sodomi." The Chief of Police in Lucknow repeatedly stated
publicly that he would like to "eradicate homosexuality which is against
Indian culture."'
In Little Sister.s the claimants argued. and the Court acknowledged,
that the legislation had been used for \ears by customs officials to inhibit
the bookstore's ability to import into Canada literature which "consisted
largely of books that included gay and lesbian literature, travel information, general interest periodicals, academic studies related to homosexualitv. \IDSHIV safe-sex ad\isory material, and gay and lesbian erotica.""
As noted, man\ of the items identified as obscene and confiscated by
customs officials contained educational material directed towards promotinc sexual health among men who ha\e sex with men, similar to that
confiscated in the Lucknox case. \\ hile the Court cannot be said to have
endorsed the customs officials' perceptions as to what constitutes obscene
materials, the Court's formal equalit approach to the issue resulted in a
ruling that it \\ as not necessary for the go emnment to enact provisions to
protect against such abuses ofpowxer in the future.
If one accepts the assertion that a countr\ 's approach to defining and
enforcing obscenity la\\ s with respect to material which contains the
expression of non-normative sexualities is indicative of the society's
degree of tolerance towards sexual div ersit\. then the fact that the legal
approach and societal reaction to 'obscene material' discussing or depicting non-normatix e sexual acts would be similar in two countries \N ith such
radicallx different legal status for sexual minorities, such as Canada and
India, lends credence to the argument that legal status alone will not create
tolerance.

66
IGLHRC Action Alert, "Demand the Immediate Release of Hl AIDS Prevention Workers
Dciamned under 5domy and ()hccnty Laws", online: International Ga", and Lesbian Human Rights
('Olmmision - AAv,, iglhrc.org/world' s ia
l India 2001 Jul_2.html> (accessed March 21, 2004). see
al, ('ossman. ipra note 29
67. Kell ( ogskcll, "India Condemned For .ntI-Ga\ Abu'es. online: The Gully <http://
w\%, thegully.com cssays gaym undo 020412 ga._ lcbianindia.html>.
(x
S'upra nolo 63 at para. I.
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IV. Il'iv Evaimine Scxual E.\/rcs. ion "
Michel Foucault stated that the key to understanding the history of human
sexuality is not to:
...determine whether one sa\ s cs or no to sex ...
but to account for the

fact that it Is being spoken about, to disco\ cr who does the speaking, the
positions and \ iewpoints from ,which they speak, the institutions which
prompt people to speak about it and which store and distribute the things
that are said. "
I use the term sexual expression to refer to a particular type of sexual
expression: the social expression of sexuality. Franscisco Valdes states that
"the social expression of minority sexual identity is the ultimate target and
battlegound ... because ,ocial expression of same-sex desire galvanizes
the politics of self and group identification among lesbians and gay men
by challenging the claimed superiority or actual hegemony of cross-sex
desire.-" While I don't agree wvith \aldes' ultimate conclusion that sexual
expression of this sort challenges heterosexual norms by bolstering group
identity among sexual minorities I do agree, for reasons to be discussed.
that, in part due to its per\asi\e nature, it assists in the challenging of
heterosexual hegemony. \'aldes employs the term 'social sexual expression' to represent those forms of communication which signal in social
forms or settings the underl. ing sexuality of the speaker. tlie identifies this
as the social expression of desire.- Valdes identifies as examples of this
type of speech. engagement rings. familN photographs, and lifestyle
anecdotes. I use the term to refer to expression such as he describes as well
as cultural sexual expression such as that which may be found in film,
literature and other pop culture. Valdes concludes that social sexual
expression is important for sexual minorities in order to promote visibility
and recognition: he argues that the presence of social sexual expression
among heterosexuals is so pervasix e it has a silencing effect on the sexual
expression of sexual minorities. While this may be the case, I will focus on
the subversive work done by social sexual expression as a result of its

69. MIichel Foucault, The Ihitor) of .Seiiuali 1i,;umc /:An Introditition, (New York: Vintage
Books, 1978) at
l.
70. Francisco Valdes. "Acts of Power. Cimes of Knowledge: Some ()h.riations on Desire, Law
and Ideology in the Politics of Exprcsion at the end of the Twentieth Century" (1997) i J. Gender
Race & Just. 213 at 215.
71. Ibid.

422

The Dalhousie Law Journal

adoption, and subsequent adaptation of dominant cultural norms, customs
and rituals. I would argue that heterosexual expression of sexual desire is
a cultural phenomenon and that hetero-normative standards and understandings of sexuality both inform and reflect dominant culture. As a
result, invasion of these cultural rituals by sexual minorities can disrupt
the norms that created them. The subversive effect of non-normative
performance of these cultural rituals is heightened because cultural rituals
carry \v ith them commonly understood meaning. Culture, as suggested by
Kapur. is employed to destabilize culture.- An example of this is found in
Terry Gold's reference to:
... the camp xNay that gay activists in the United States use symbols of
patriotism such as the flag. The traditional American patriot stands in
front of the Stars and Stripes, and he has a marine haircut and a gun. The
queer nationalist is in the same position, k ith the same haircut, but has
traded the gun for a dildo. and is quite likely a she. This is not so much a
greater nation as the old one turned upside dox n."
My examination focuses on the social expression of same-sex desire not
on pornography. The brief examination of obscenity laws above, was
employed only to illustrate that the legal successes of gays and lesbians in
Canada may not have diminished societal intolerance of sexual minorities
to the degree which might be expected of such successes. While pornography is often the focus of discourse regarding sexual expression, my choice
to focus, rather, on social sexual expression is deliberate. I would suggest
that the threat to heterosexual hegemony posed by social sexual minority
expression greatly exceeds the subversive potential of pornography, not
because the actual depiction of non-normatix e sexual acts is not subversive but because, unlike pornography, social sexual expression infiltrates
nearly every aspect of a culture. This provides it with a higher profile and
lends it more credibility. Social sexual expression is ubiquitous in both
sexual majority and minority cultures. As a result, it acts as a medium
through hich minorities can appropriate cultural rituals to express their
sexuality in formats readily understood by heterosexual majorities.
The puritanical tinge of British colonialism still lingers in both Canada
and India, where sex and sexual expression in general are often characterized as shameful and secret. "Under this norm the expression of non-

72.
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conforming desire ... remains among tile most shamed and secrcted of
domains."
It is important to note that there are actually two distinct
normatixe restrictions on 'acceptable conduct' at work here. Any overt
sexual expression, regardless of the gender s of its subjects, is a challenge
to social norms which discourage open dialogue on sex. Separate from
this is the normative understanding of sexuality as an interaction between
txo individuals of opposite sex. In a wxay that pomography cannot, the
social sexual expression of sexual minorities, while nonetheless a communication of sexual attraction and conduct between individuals of the same
gender, allows challenges to normatixe understandings of sexuality
wvithout requiring that puritanical norms discouraging overt sexual
dialogue be taken on at the same time. I do not, ho\wexer, wish to be
misunderstood as asserting that the content of social sexual expression is
not sexual. The distinction between the social expression of desire and
\\hat Valdes labels the sexual expression of desire is a distinction based on
method of expression not on the presence or absence of sexuality. Valdes
carefully distinguishes the sexual expression of desire from the social expression of desire by desexualizing the latter.' I \ould suggest that he
does this in order to combat a common misperception among heterosexual
communities that sex is the defining characteristic of all gays and lesbians.
"Gay sexualit,. according to this common understanding, is all-encompassing, obsessive. and completely divorced from love, long-term relationships, and family structure ... ".- 1do not think it is necessary, in this
context, to emphasize the distinction Valdes makes. The inclination to desexualize gay and lesbian identity in an attempt to 'fit into' mainstream
society may make sense within a rights discourse context: howex er, in the
context of destabilizing heterosexual norms it is unnecessary to diminish
any of those aspects of the sexual minority which are distinct. Holding
hands with a lover in public, discussing a particularly attractive drag king
with co-workers. or wearing xwedding rings are expressions to the public
of one's choice/s in sexual partneris. Sexuality informs the social expression of desire as much as it does the overt sexual expression of desire.
Setting aside normative aversions to the depiction of sex in general, I
would suggest that the challenge to dominant sexual norms, posed by the
expression of same-sex desire, is the same whether it is communicated
through the portrayal of two men having anal sex, or three women having
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oral sex, or a queer sitcom which portrays network television's first
lesbian kiss, or a book that talks about families with two blue dads.77 The
fearful response to any of these forms of expression relates to the
challenge posed by alternative models of human relation to those normative models of sexual interaction underlying the heterosexual hegemony.
Which people have what genitals and what they do or don't do with them
in public or private is not the source of the perceived threat. An examination of Judith Butler's theory of gender provides support for this assertion. " Butler conceptualizes gender as a "... shifting and contextual
phenomenon, gender does not denote a substantive being, but a relative
point of convergence among culturally and historically specific sets of relations.""' Butler states that gender is pertormative. She argues that sex is
not the precursor of gender and that gender is not the cultural interpretation of sex. She asserts that gender is not a stable identity. Gender, Butler
suggests, is created through the repetition of norms. The category of sex,
she maintains, is normative, not natural. She states that the repeated
performance of norms actually produces the male/female binary gender is
thought to reflect."' -[G]endered meanings frame the hypothesis and the
reasoning of those biomedical inquiries that seek to establish "sex" for us
as it is prior to the cultural meanings that it acquires."'"
In mainstream culture, in both Canada and India, a binary model for
both sex and gender has predominated. We haxe strict normative standards
goxerning the constructs of gender and, according to Butler, sex as well.
Members of sexual minorities often fit into neither of these normative
constructs. If gender is performatixe, and if the biological 'body' is
actually culturally pre-determined, in part through gender performance,
rather than a pre-discursi\e natural state, then repeated subversive performances of normative rituals may threaten the male/female binary model
of sex created through the normative performance of such rituals. I would
suggest that the social expression of sexuality is also performative. Social
sexual expression is the expression of sexuality through the performance
of cultural rituals that express sexual desire. The social sexual expression
of sexual minorities then, is the subversive perfornance of cultural rituals

77. See Chamberlain v.Surrci School District \ 36, [2002] 4 SC.R.710, where a parent organization fought to have the children's book One Dad. Tto Dads. Brwii'n Dads, Blue Dads which depicted same-ses parented families in a positi),e light, banned from the student curriculum.
78. Judith Butler. Gender Trouble. Feminism and the Subcrsion oIdentit '(New York: Routledge,
1990).
79, Ibid. at i5.
80. Supra note 78.
81
Butler, upra note 78 at 13).
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that express sexual desire.
Under Butler's theory of performative gender the repeated performance
of normative rituals operates on a sophisticated social level at which the
subjects/actors are not aware of the performances. It is likely however,
that these gender performances are simultaneously occurring on a variety
of levels. The performance of social sexual expression may be operating
on both conscious and subconscious levels. Both types of performance
subvert notions of *gender' - gender in this context meaning the dominant understanding of gender as a cultural reflection of sex. Butler's
performative theor\ challenges the dominant understanding of 'gender'
and biological sex as inextricably linked. The expression of same-sex
desire challenges the dominant understanding of sexuality and 'gender' as
inextricably linked. Under Butler's theory, it becomes clear why Canadian
and Indian societies socially police gender in such a vigilant manner>'
Policing gender is a method of protecting the male female binary upon
\\hich these societies are premised. Butler's theory also offers analogous
reasoning as to why minority sexual expression is treated and reacted to
differently than heterosexual expression. It is treated and received differentlv in order to inhibit the revelation of alternatixe performances of rituals that evidence the fallacy of the binary male female model of understanding sexuality and gender. Lesbians in tuxedos with gold wedding
bands, drag queens who can 'pass.' and Indian women whose courtship
and first sexual encounter occur during the performance of a traditional
fasting ritual conducted to ensure the longevity of their husbands, all
demonstrate non-normative sexual performances which trouble normative
understandings of the links between sex, gender and sexuality.
BJ Wray, in discussing Shawna Dempsey and Lorri Milan's 1997
performance of The Lesbian .autinl Park Rangers provides an example
of subversive performance in the context of nationalism and citizenship."
Dempsey and Millan humorously interrogate the "unnaturalness" of lesbian
sexuality from within the confines of the state-sanctioned
"naturalness" of BanffNational Park.... Citizenship, as we will see in the
Lesbian National Park Rangers, is not a static delineation of national
belonging but is an active, ongoing performance that can never be fully or
finally conferred. Conceptualized as performance, citizenship becomes
newly accessible for re-signification by minority subjects."
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As Wrav notes, their perlormance imades a significant site of Canadian
nationalism and exploits its 'natural areas of Canadian significance' in
order to challenge the assumption that lesbianism is unnatural and to
contest the predominantly exclusionary practices utilized to create national
identit\. Similar to the impact I would suggest results from the expression
of minority sexuality through the subxersive performance of cultural
rituals. "...The Lesbian National Park Rangers insists upon a mode of lesbian acti ism that critiques con\ entional discourses of national and sexual
ith these dominant
identification through direct engagement
'5
paradigms."
Despite the presence or absence of a gay and lesbian rights movement,
the social expression of same-sex desire has caused similar reaction among
mainstream culture in both India and Canada. Mainstream cultures in both
of these post-colonial societies hake. at some point, blamed external influences for importing 'homosexuality' into their countries by arguing that
such beha\ ]or is not consistent with their culture. In Canada it was thought
that 'homosexuality" "could not be part of the hard, pure colonial life." '
I have suggested that the impact of subversixe cultural behavior, such as
social sexual minority expression. and the acquisition of rights are interdependent. Both a ga\ and lesbian rights movement, and the social expression of minority sexualities are present in Canada." As a result, it may be
difficult to isolate the individual impact of each in Canada; this is not the
case in India. The lack of legal protection for sexual minorities in India,
and the lack of significant legal progress towards equality and the acquisition of legal rights for sexual minorities in India may provide a clearer
opportunity to examine the impact of cultural appropriation through social
sexual expression by sexual minorities in India than might be the case in
Canada.

V Social Sexual E.tre.s.sion in India
In India, government officials have argued that sodomy and oral sex should
not be decriminalized because homosexual behavior is not in keeping with

XS mhid at 163
X6. Goldic. mpra note 4 at 14 In the late nineteenth ccnturx a briet'trip to Canada made by Oscar
\\ ildc parked diS Cu,,,,0n that "tiht sort" of beha\ ior. for which Oscar \ ilde had become a symbol,

certainly ,,as not native to Canadian culture.
.7. The prescnce of a gay and lesbian rights movement in Canada has been discussed at length.
For a discussion on minorilt social cxtual speech in Canada, such as film and pop culture, see
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Indian culture. Members of the Hindu right ha\ e pointed to the effects of
\\csternization in India as the cause of this scourge of homosexuality.
'Sexual subalterns such as ga\ s and lesbians are being targeted as Western
contaminants threatening to erode Indian culture and ethos." '
The 1998 film Fire. by Indian producer Deepa Mehta, demonstrates
the impact of cultural appropriation and sub\ ersion through the social
expression of same-sex desire. Indicative of its impact is the significant
effect this main,,tream movie had on the issue of sexual minority in India.
The film depicts a lesbian relationship between tx\o sisters-in-law named
Sita and Radha. \lehta's choice in names for these characters is indicative
of her Nerx purposeful use of Indian cultural symbols and rituals throughout the film. The names Radha and Sita are "the repositories of Indian
cultural values in ancient texts and scripts. " " The film frequentl\ depicts
Sita and Radha's social expression of desire for each other. In one scene
the women, while having a picnic with their husbands and mother-in-law,
share an intimate moment while Radha. at the request of her husband,
massages Sita in front of the family. \ lehta legitimates the actions of these
lox ers b\ her use of Indian Hindu culture to express their mutual desire.
Their performance of khari uchauth. a fasting ritual kept by wi\es to
ensure their husband's longe vity. ends in the first sexual encounter
between the \omen after Radha. rather than Sita's husband as is the tradition, gixes Sita the blessing to break her fast. The film appropriates traditional cultural expressions of desire, imputing legitimacy to the relationship; through its use of these rituals to express the growing sexual awareness and attraction between the sisters-in-law it unavoidably adapts the
traditional meaning of the particular rituals performed. In the final scenes
of the film, culture is invoked to provide ultimate sanction for their relationship. Mehta depicts an altemati\ e version of angnipariksha, a burning
ritual employed to ascertain the purity of the mythical Sita, in which the
mythical Sita survix es the fire thus affirming her purity; unfortunately, the
mythical Sita is exiled from her community despite having established her
purity.9i In the film, Radha's sari accidentally catches on fire. She too
survives the fire, affirming her purity despite her sexual relationship with
a woman. Howex er, unlike in the myth, Radha is rewarded and reunited
w ith her lover rather than exiled from her community.
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The screening of Fire in India sparked a national controversy that
included protests, violence against moviegoers, destruction of theatre
property and a second review by the Indian Censor Board.92 As a result of
the protests and %iolence, cinemas nationwide were forced to stop showing the film." A petition was filed %%
ith the Supreme Court of India by a
group of film producers and laxyers requesting that the Court order the
go\ ernment to stop the violence and \ andalism."4 The petitioners asserted
that the Chief Minister of Maharashta and his party, Shix Sena, instigated
the violence under the pretext of expressing their opposition to the film.
The goxernment response to the petition xas to return the film to the
Censor Board for a second re\ iexx. The Censor Board once again approved
the film."' The Supreme Court of India dismissed the petition after an
election in Maharashtra ousted the ShiP Sena party."6
Critics challenged the film on the ground that its depiction of lesbianism in a middle-class Hindu family %\asan inauthentic cultural representation. Traditionalist contingents of the Indian feminist movement stated that
"Ms. Mlehta's disdain for Indians except those \\ho are supposedly sabotaging tradition by seeking sexual fulfillment in defiance of social norms
... oo/es out of virtually ex ery dialogue in the film." It seems that the
depiction of lesbianism \\as not the only objectionable issue; it may be
that a significant source of the controversy and outcry was that it was a
depiction of Indian lesbianism.
One particular scene in the film seems to predict that conservative
Indians, such as members of the Shix Sena. would perceive the film as a
cultural attack. In this scene Sita's husband, whose attire and demeanor is
\ erN wx
esternized throughout the film, is ha,,ing dinner v. ith the family of a
Chinese \\ornan with wNhom he is ha\ing an affair. During dinner, the
father of the woman viciously attacks Indian culture. Sita's husband
acknowledges his criticisms and says nothing to defend the culture of his
people. Mehta thus makes a comment, or perhaps a response to the criticisms she forecasted, by including in the film a heterosexual character that
overtly rejects Indian culture in pursuing his heterosexual relationship,

Kapur, supra note 22 at 373.
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while her lesbian characters repeatedly embrace Indian custom and ritual
both to pursue their courtship and to express their sexual desire.
The Chief Minister of the Shiv Sena stated that his party would stop
the attacks and %iolence if the characters' names were changed from Sita
and Radha to Muslim names. Noting that Mehta agreed to change the name
of Sita to Neeta, Kapur wvrites "'lehta'scompromise is a move that stands
out as a stark example of the xa\ s in which Indian society is being held
ransom to one version, one storv and one truth about Indian culture."' '
There \\as fear that such an inauthentic representation of Indian culture
would contaminate an otherwise pure Indian society. Those opposed to the
movie portrayed Indian culture as having clear, fixed meanings that needed
to be protected from foreign influences."
\\h\ did this reaction to Fire occur in India'? Theorist Madhavi Sunder
suggests that the film seres as a critical cultural perspective that exposes
differences in a culture that is normally represented as homogenous.""' As
a result, it affirms alternatixe notions of Indian cultural identity. She
describes the reaction of the Hindu nght to the film as a form of cultural
protectionism, similar to notions of intellectual property law:
Cultural protectionists., \hile not explicitly relying on intellectual property
la%\ to support their position, concei\ed Indian culture as ha\ ing an
essential meaning that needed to be legally preserved and protected against
dilution h\ foreign influence, and sought an absolute right to define Indian
culture and to exclude meanings that contradicted their definition.'"'
Sunder asserts that this cultural protectionism is a reaction to an era that
has been characterized b\ identit\ politics and legal commitment to a
cultural dissent consisting of the right to recast cultural mores, traditions,
and meanings in light of new xalues. information and needs. Sunder
suggests that the reaction to the film Fire rexeals how post-colonial India
"is characterized by narrov\ nationalist narratixes that define Indian
identity in the past and in opposition to the modem wxest. '112 She further
notes that these nationalist narratixes create 'cultural boundaries' which
are difficult for minorities to overcome. While I would agree with Sunder
that the prevalence of identity politics contributes to this cultural protec-
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tionism, I do not agree that there is legal commitment to cultural dissent in
either Canada or India. In Canada, the Charter may have ensured legal
commitment to political and legal dissent but not, I would suggest, to
cultural dissent. While it islikely that cultural protectionism in post-colonial India stems, in part, from a strong sense of Indian nationalism
de\ eloped as a reaction to fear of cultural imperialism and cultural appropriation, as has been suggested b\ academics,"" this does not provide a
full explanation for the phenomenon. To promote tolerance of deviance it
is necessary to disrupt the stability of those dominant norms from which
the subject is de\ iant. Sexual norms are an aspect of culture. I would assert
that the moti\ation behind cultural protectionism isnot solely 'cultural
survival'; it is,to a significant degree. an effort to maintain control of
those cultural elements \\hich support the dominant norms underlying
heterosexual hegemony and as a result sustain historical power imbalances.
To employ culture when telling a different stor\, or painting a different
picture makes the picture or the story more credible. Non-normative
storie , if credible, challenge those normative stories and pictures that
reinforce traditional po\%er distributions. Indian conservatives, who
percci\ ed the film as an attempt to convert \\ omen to lesbianism, expressed
concern that "... if \\omen's physical needs are fulfilled through lesbian
act, the institution of marriage \\ould collapse."''4
In the aftermath of the film Fire. many Indian queers came out of their
clu'.ets for the fir'.t time. Indian lesbians in \e\ Delhi brandished banners
proclaiming that "lesbianism is part of our heritage.""" The first ever New
Delhi Pride Parade was held in the aftermath of the Fire controversy. 0 6 As
Kapur notes. Fir, portrayed Indian lesbians 'as not simply abandoning the
terrain of Indian cultural values, but rather, trying to write themselves into
the script."' 7 Proclamations of heritage and demands to be written into
the cultural script might, in a rights discourse, be identified as assimilatixe. How ecser. in the context of non-normative performances of cultural
rituals, I \\ ould suggest that they are subversive.

103 Sec Sunder. .upirnote 25, see also Kapur, suipru note 22
I104Kapur. supra note 58 at 19 1 am not Sugge,ting that the film \%.is a recruitment effort, but
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The actors, filmmakers and artists vho filed the petition with the
Supreme Court of India requesting that the goernment do something to
stop the rioting and violence dubbed the circumstances a "cultural emergencv.1" ' I note that they characterized the \ iolence not as an attack on
sexual minorit\ equalit\ or the integrity of the Indian Constitution's
guarantee of fundamental rights but rather as a cultural threat originating
from the cultural protectionists "... imposition of a single set of values on
India's multi-faceted societ. "' "
Forty-six years before the Supreme Court of Canada determined in
Egan, that sexual orientation was an analogous ground of discrimination under s.15 of the Charter.' Jim Egan, began his activist career
writing anti-homophobic letters and articles.' " As the founder of the
Association for Social Kno\ledge x\ hosc mandate was to "help society
understand and accept variations from the sexual norm" Egan relied on
forms of political and social expression to pursue social justice for sexual
minorities long before legal mechanisms to do so were available.'" The
film Jim Loves Jack tells the storx of Egan's acti\ ism and long-term love
affair with partner Jack Nesbitt. The purpose of discussing social sexual
minority expression in India and juxtaposing its role in the pursuit for sexual
minority equality with the ga\ and lesbian rights movement in Canada, is
not to imply that the social expression of same-sex desire does not occur in
Canada. Rather, as noted, the comparison is drawn because in India a rights
regime for sexual minorities has not been achieved and as a result, the
social expression of same-sex desire, through cultural appropriation has
played a more prominent or at least more readily ascertainable role in India's
sexual equality movement than it may have in Canada.

VI. Power FacilitatesSubversion
In the introduction I suggested that the acquisition of rights can provide
access to power which can facilitate some deconstruction of normative
standards. While the acquisition of rights, due to its homogenizing and
essentializing effect may not itself create tolerance for difference, it does
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create power- social change requires both tolerance and power. Inescapably, "poxer is as integral an element of all social life as are meanings and
norms ... All social interaction involves the use of power, as a necessary
implication of the logical connection between human action and transformative capacity."' 4 Implicit within the concept of essentialism, which I
have argued is a by-product of rights-based models of equality, is the
opportunity to create common identity and community. With the creation
of an identity, particularly one that has been ascribed rights, comes power.
"[R]ights can be important in consciousness-raising, in mobilizing
marginalized groups, and in providing these groups with a powerful
language with which to \oice and legitimize their demands." ' 5 The legal
acknowvledgment of even one alternative conception of sexuality in Canada

has provided a window through \Nhich sexual minorities can gain further
access to those dominant cultural rituals which I have suggested have tremendous sub\ersi e potential.
Evidence of this ma\ be found in the fight for same-sex marriage in
Canada. Although gay and lesbian couples, in Canada had already gained
access to almost every right, and in some provinces every right," 16 which a
heterosexual couple would receive upon marriage, the public controversy
and national debate \hich stemmed from the Ontario and British Columbia same-sex marriage decisions \as astonishing.' 7 That the same-sex
114. A (iddcns, .1 ContenitorarvCritique o1 Historical (laterialism, 2nd ed. (London: MacMillan
Press. I W5)at 2S Giddens identifies po\k er a, one of the nine chief features of his social theory of
structuration \\ hue I s,ould not Aholeheartedly adopt his theory of ,ocial change I would agree that
power is an unavoidable social reality and as a result a requisite ingredient for soctal change.
I15 Kanr AC('onman, supra note 27 at 257. paraphrasing the argument of feminist writer Elizabeth Schneider
116 Subsequent to the decision in I/ v H..sipra note 14. in which the C ourt ruled that the definition
of spouse included samc-,e\ partners, the federal and pro\ incial governments enacted legislation
" hich pro\ ided same-se" couples with access to child and spousal support. Upon the Supreme
Court of Canada's s. 15 ruling in l'riend, supra note 14, Alberta became the last province to include
,csual orientation a, a prohibited ground of discrtmination under their human rights legislation.
'some province, have also created legislatic pro\ iions tor registered domestic partnerships. See
for example, No\,a Scotia. where even prior to the legalization of same-sex marriage, same-sex
couples who registered under the 'italStativtics. t, R.S. S. 19SL. c.494 attained every legal right
heterose\ual couples acquire through marriage
117. On I I June 2003, one dayafterthe Halpcr ruling in Ontario. the Globe and Alail printed more
than sc'sen stories on gay and lesbian relationships, online: Equal Marriage <http/online:/
,k \ w.equalmarriage ca>. See for example Derek Rogusk\. Marriage is Debased" The Globe and
fail (1 I June 2003) A9: (illc,
,archildon, "The Court Gets it Right" The Globe and (Jail (II
June 2I ) A19 Kirk Miakin, -(ay Marriage is Legaliied'" The Globe and .foil (I I June 2003) AL:
I stanislao ()/ic\\ c/,. S'am c-s\ Married Couples Rejoice'" The Globe and fad ( I June 2003) A4:
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PM ) "Canada's First Legal Same-Sex Marriage" Thc Globe and fail (online: II June, 2003 3:37 PM).
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marriage issue is so hotly debated in a country \,here gays and lesbians
have already achie\ ed Its underlying rights' s implies that something more

is occurring than basic rights discourse. I would suggest that the uproar is,
not unlike in Fire, a response to the fear of widespread social expression
of same-sex desire. As noted b\ the Ontario Court of Appeal in Halpern,
"'[t]hrough the institution of marriage indi\ iduals can publicly express their
lo, c and commitment to each other."'" M arriage, the Court explained, is a

public recognition and affirmation of a couples' feelings and desires for
each other.
During the summer of 2003. after the Ontario Court ofAppeal decision
in Halpern was released, newspapers across the country published front-

page pictures of grooms kissing and of lesbian couples in tuxedos on the
steps of the Toronto City Hall. Opinion polls on gay and lesbian marriage
were collected and published almost daily. In July, 2003, the Globe and
Mail published a \seek-long series on queer families. 'For better or w\orse,'

everyone in Canada spent the summer of 21)03 talking about same-sex
marriage.' 2' Both legal and public debate focused not on the rights associated with marriage, likelh because the decisions had little impact on gay
and lesbian rights, but rather on the meaning of marriage in Canada. What
is the purpose of marriage'? Should marriage be a state sanctioned institution? Is marriage a religious convention? Should it be the state or the

church that acts as gatekeeper to the institution? Is marriage nothing more
than a paternalistic custom that historicalks in\ olved an economic arrangement between men'?
Gary Kinsman argues that rather than seeking equality through the
pursuit of rights such as same-sex marriage

"...

we need to contest social

forms such as the state institutionalization of marriage and dcs elop our
relationships based on democracy, equality and social justice.' 21 1 \would
suggest that the actions taken by sexual minorities such as the lesbian couple
whose wedding ceremony and reception I recently attended is a step
towards contesting oppressive social forms, and can support the development of relationships based on democracy, equality and social justice. These

118. I recognize that \kithout marriage samc-sc\ parincr, in some areas do not have access to the
same legal infrastructure regarding division of aset, upon separation. In addition, as noted by the
Court in Halpern, without mariage same-sex couples must reside together for a period of time
before acquiring the rights heterosexuals can gain instantly through marriage.
119. Halpern, supra note 14 at para. 5.
120. See e.g. T. Tyler & T. Huffman, (iay Couple Married After Ruling" The Toronto Star ( I I June
2003). see also A. Dunfield, "Vatican Releases Rules on Same- cx Marriage" The Globe and Mail
(31 July 2003).
121. Supra note 24 at para. 221.
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women performed what is, in Canada, a recognized cultural ritual to
express a committed desire for one another. Not unlike the characters in
\lehta's film Fire, they incorporated a great number of dominant cultural
rituals into a ceremony and celebration held to recognize and affirm a sexual
relationship between two women. Yet, they married in Nova Scotia,
despite having had the option to be married in a province that would
legally recognize their union in the same manner as a heterosexual marriagc. They did not register under the Noxa Scotia Vital Statistics Act as
a registered domestic partnership. They did not make an oral or written
separation agreement to address division of assets in the event that their
relationship ends. Their union occurred without any government sanction
or the exchange of a single legal right. Hox\vccr, they used exceptionally
traditional cultural rituals to express their relationship. With their performance of a traditional wedding ceremony and reception the couple
publicly expressed a non-normative sexuality and desire, while at the same
time exploiting the legitimacy, authority, and credibility that such cultural
rituals command. The social opportunity to perform these rituals in front
of mainstream society may have been provided to these women as a result
of increased acceptance into the dominant norm of certain sexual minority
conduct as a result of legal victories in Canada. That the British Columbia
Court of Appeal, the Quebec Court of Appeal and the Ontario Court of
Appeal had determined that same-sex couples are constitutionally entitled
to be civilly married, may have provided an additional degree of mainstream legitimacy for their union despite its legally non-normative form.
While likely inadvertent, I would argue that their non-normative
performance of a traditional cultural ritual had a subversive effect on the
meaning of the institution of marriage in Canada. Many of the criticisms
commonly launched at the institution of marriage are not applicable in this
context. The assertion that the institution of marriage is based on an
exchange of economic rights was not relevant. The history of sexism and
misogyny often ascribed to the institution of marriage were not pertinent
here. The normative meanings of the institution of marriage were disrupted.
Disrupted enough to dissolve the normative boundaries that exclude some
and accept others, making tolerance of difference unnecessary? No.
Disruptive enough to soften or weaken those boundaries to allow for still
further deconstruction of the dominant norms underlying the institution of

122. Their wedding took place prior to the Nova Scotia ruling legalizing same-sex marriage in that
province.
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marriage, \which will help promote tolerance for sexual relationships that
cannot, or do not fit inside the norm'? Perhaps.
In Canada (.4ttornev General) v. .tlosso., the appellant sought recognition of his partner under his employment benefits for bereavement leave.' 23
Although sexual orientation was already a prohibited ground of discrimination \Nhich \\oUld have provided a remedy for Mossop, he argued
unsuccessfully that s.15 of the Charter required that the Ontario Human
Rights Code '"
definition of family status include same-sex partners. ,Iossop
was not about the acquisition of a right but \\as rather an attempt to destabilize the normative meaning of familv. Justice LaForest stated in lo.s so)
that "[t]he appellant here argues that "family status" should cover a
relationship dependent on a same-sex living arrangement. While some may
refer to such a relationship as a "family". I do not think it has yet reached
that status in the ordinary use of language." ' - Only ten years later the
federal government argued. in their factum filed in the same-sex marriage
reference, that in the 2 1"centur\ the institution of marriage can include
same-sex couples and the Charter requires it to do So.i2 Only ten years
after V\o.s-op, the Ontario Court of Appeal, in Halpern, recognized and
affirmed the validity of same-sex families by ruling that their relationships
\\ere entitled to the same degree of social status and credibility afforded
heterosexual couples who marry. Only ten years after Mossop, the
Supreme Court of Canada stated that the right of same-sex couples to marry
unequivocall. flo\ s from the ('harter.'-h During the course of those ten
years the meaning of family changed in Canada. Has it changed enough?
No, but it has changed.

Conclusion
It is important to recognize that the benefits of disrupting discriminatory
or exclusionary norms has its limits. Butler, upon reflecting on her
assertions in Gender Trouble, ten \cars after it \\as published stated "Iwas
writing in the tradition of immanent critique that seeks to provoke critical
examination of the basic vocabulary of the movement and not criticism
that seeks to undermine it altogether."'12- Setting aside theoretical
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purposes, there is little to be gained for minorities from the process of
subversion if done simply for the sake of subversion. Subversion should
be employed to destabilize normatixe assumptions, such as binary
constructions of gender or sexuality. which lead to exclusionary and
discriminatory practices and the resultant perpetuation of traditional power
imbalances. It should not be used to deconstruct notions of sexuality to the
point xxhere the strength sexual minorities found in sexual subcultures is
destroyed. Meaning, as Kapur suggests is also the case wxith culture,"'
should be conceptualized as a constantly changing process that engages
historical eN ents and is challenged by contemporary evolutions in society.
\\ hile to deconstruct meaning to the point where meaning attaches to nothIn(m\a dissolve the tarcts used to perpetuate oppression it would likely
also dissoixe the goals and targets xxhich drive the pursuit of equality.
Equality consists of both legal and social aspects. The acquisition of
rights may not disrupt normative standards as is necessary to promote the
tolerance required for social equality: hoxxex er. it can and does create legal equality for oppressed minorities. In Canada, the structure of our rights
regime has promoted a homogenized, essentialized notion of sexual minority which does little to disrupt those sexual norms underlying heterosexual hegemony. Ho\xexe r,an alternatixe infrastructure for the acquisition of power in Canada does not currently exist and I wxould suggest that
it ma\ not be necessary. Provided segments of sexual minority communities can access dominant cultural rituals, wvhich a rights regime such as is
present in Canada can provide, subversion can occur from within the
s\ stem by the appropriation and adaptation of cultural norms through the
social expression of sexual diversity. Such expression, which is per\asive
and xxhich does not require an essentialized, homogenized, non-subversix e,de-sexualized representation of sexual minority will facilitate further
access to dominant cultural paradigms for a greater spectrum of sexual
minorities: this creates a positive feedback loop with the potential to
perpetuate more power for, and tolerance of, a greater spectrum of sexual
minorities in heterosexual society.
In India, the 'feedback loop' may function in the opposite direction.
Sexual minorities in India have not yet achieved a significant degree of
legal equality. That said, an equality movement premised on cultural
appropriation, as is evidenced by films such as Fire, is occurring in India.
I X\ould suggest that the constitutional infrastructure to support a gay and
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lesbian rights movement in India, as a result of the equality provisions
'
enshrined in the C'onstitution of India, already exists." ) As the Indian
maority continues to be confronted \\ith subversive performances of
recognizable and credible cultural symbols, the degree of tolerance
towards these non-normative !sexual practices will gromv. Perhaps at some
point, an increase in tolerance \\ill place Indian sexual minorities in a
position to pursue legal acceptance through India's constitutionally
guaranteed equality rights.

129. Supra note 8.

